weekly Letter from the Bishop of Teruel and Albarracín
for Sunday March 27, 2011
Perhaps the question of title is not well formulated. More than what, the right thing would be to ask who the human embryo. In our response to this question will depend, ultimately, our position on the issue.
If we follow the method proposed personalist bioethics do a triple approach to the subject: the philosophical, ethical and legal. First, try to define the status of the embryo from a philosophical-anthropological perspective, that is, from what this is. When I stand before the embryo, science me I'm just saying no to a living being, but this belongs to the human species: "it is clear that, in a dispassionate view, if I think the coordination, continuity and given the gradual development of the embryo, these properties perfectly meet the essential criteria set by reflection tabiológica me for the definition of an individual .... Therefore, the embryo from the moment of fusion of gametes is a real human individual, not a potential human individual. "
But that individual of the human species: a person? In the philosophical debate (not legal), the human being "is" virtual person tude of rational nature, not "becomes" person because the effective exercise of certain functions (such as the ability to relate, the sensitivity, rationality). Being a person as an ontological, ie, possession of a substantial personal status can not be purchased or decrease gradually, but it is a condition ra - ciation: no person can be today and tomorrow cease to be or vice versa. The absence (defined as failure to act or deprivation) of the properties or functions does not negate the existence of the person itself, which remains such by nature, as it exists before its qualities.
The functions are "person", not "the" person: the po session of certain qualities or the manifestation of certain functions are not "induce" the presence of the person, but on the contrary, the per son is the real condition of the possibility of the existence and operation of certain functions. The consequence is that the zygote, embryo, fetus (same as the infant or child) are as people.
Clearly there is a gap between being in itself and as this is obvious: the embryo or dying do not appear to us in their size, as his conscience, as an adult man. But the incomplete expression does not change its ontological status, being a person.
According to this reasoning, once defined who the embryo, ie, its ontological status, it will come from an ethical and a legal status.
From the ethical point of view, recognizing that the human embryo is a person is making a statement that implies some requirements. This is more than a cognosci tive data: a theoretical knowledge and indifferent with no obligation for anything. If I say that the human embryo is a person, it becomes a source of ethics and, therefore, of obligation and responsibility to the freedom of the individual who stands before the subject. When I'm on a human life, I have a moral obligation protect it.
This debate is particularly important to our concept of freedom. This should always be referred to the right and must never become an absolute to which it might be possible to render a life in the moment there is a conflict of freedoms: freedom of the mother and embryo, the old terminal the family. If that happens, would result in a flawed proposal of what freedom is and its responsible exercise. Defined
the ontological and pointed the ethical, legal should be a consequence of these and protect, where appropriate, the life of the weakest. We
to a social debate in which we must be the voice of the voiceless. The Church is clear. This was advocated by John Paul II, "can never justify the killing of an innocent." At this historic moment, we do our those words.
† Carlos Escribano Subías
Bishop of Teruel and Albarracín
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